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ARTICLE

Bridging Internal and External Security: Lessons from the European Security and Defence Policy

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ABSTRACT This article suggests that the development of the European Security and Defence Policy has not only signalled a new tempo in EU policy making but seems also to have unforeseen consequences in that it pushes forward the development of the EU's internal security policy. The link is visible most clearly in the crisis management capabilities that have been built up with external operations in mind, but that, once established, have been perceived as having internal utility. It is argued in this article that it is comparatively much easier to develop such capacities in the field of external relations and that the development of capacities, in turn, leads to the need for more shared strategic thinking. Bridging internal and external security is not friction–free, however; in particular, different views on the relative competences of the EU Council and the Commission make it more difficult. Yet, there are encouraging signs of increasingly holistic security thinking emerging within the EU.

KEY WORDS: European Union, ESDP, crisis management, civil protection, security

Introduction

One of the most intriguing products of European integration over the past decade is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). After forty years of disagreement and stalled initiatives, the EU now has the operational capacity and the political will to intervene abroad for humanitarian, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking purposes. The build up of military tools for these purposes has been matched by civilian resources,

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deployable to assist needy states at a moment's notice. The pace of recent developments, with the concept launched in 1998 and forces in the field by 2003, is nothing short of remarkable by EU standards. All of this by a supranational organization preoccupied for most of its existence by protecting its members from each other, through 'soft' means such as economic integration and political interdependence.

The speed with which ESDP has developed, however, has been matched by an equally swift change in the global security environment. Internal security concerns are back on top of the political agenda, this time because of terrorist attacks, natural disasters and various breakdowns in critical systems that have struck the European continent. New threats, and more complex threats, bring to light the difficulties of managing crises in a borderless Europe. Politicians speak increasingly to the artificial distinction between internal and external security, not only in terms of where threats originate, but also in terms of the various tools required to protect societies.

The aim of this article is to explore, using ESDP as an entry point, the potential for convergence between the EU's external and internal crisis management capacities.[1] In many respects this approach is counter–intuitive: most studies fence the ESDP off from the rest of Community decision making, treating it as a policy *sui generis* that is relevant only to external crises. It is argued, however, that there are several points at which bridges between external and internal policy might eventually emerge. This bridge building is a long way off and faces a number of deep, institutional hurdles, but today's transnational security environment requires greater scrutiny of the prospect for comprehensive EU security action in the years ahead.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section sketches the development of the ESDP briefly to show its key characteristics and its unique development dynamics. The many tensions inherent in the ESDP's role in the EU's broader security approach — tensions which militate against a comprehensive approach in the EU towards internal and external security — are then identified. The subsequent section turns the argument on its head, examining the areas which might prompt convergence in both thinking and action towards comprehensive security and crisis management. The article concludes with the suggestion that this increasing convergence might, in time, also lead to more strategic thinking on EU internal security.

The Development of the ESDP

The early development of the ESDP followed a distinctive path: one orientated towards external crisis management using military capabilities. This orientation can be explained by a number of factors, most stemming from the changing nature of international politics and security in the 1990s.

The end of the Cold War, the perception of a security vacuum in Europe and the resulting need to 'assert its identity on the international scene' through a common foreign and security policy (of which the ESDP became a main component), provided the context in which EU governments' interest began to overlap. Growing external expectations also played a role. The EU's

neighbours, especially in the Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean, looked for EU advice and support on conflict prevention and reconstruction. Moreover, the USA has pushed European states to assume new (or more) security–related burdens since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The process of integration itself also made it increasingly difficult to leave questions of security and defence out of the process. EU governments understood that their collective influence over international politics depended on their ability to harness not only the Union's powers of collective diplomatic persuasion and its undoubted economic leverage, but also to complement this with the ability to credibly threaten the use of force and, if need be, to actually use it. The ability to link these different facets of power in the international system was the Union's obvious weakness (and the comparative strength of the USA; see Duke (2002, 175–180)).

Military Crisis Management

The initial development of ESDP concentrated very much upon the military aspects, largely because of the real–world challenges on the ground in Bosnia–Herzegovina and, later, Kosovo. In 1997, EU member states agreed to incorporate the so–called Petersberg tasks (named after the *Schloss* where the Western European Union first adopted them in 1992) into the Amsterdam Treaty. These tasks — which include, but are not limited to, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking — gave a new facet to the EU's external role and also opened the door for the use of military force by the Union.[2]

Furthermore, the adoption of the so–called 'Headline Goals' in December 1999 focused the debate squarely upon the ability of the EU to respond to external crises with military tools. The goal of having 50–60,000 troops ready by the year 2003 for operations lasting up to one year gave the EU member states an ambitious goal to strive for. This was soon followed by pledges from EU governments (except Denmark who exercised an opt–out) on the contribution of equipment and personnel for operations on a case–by–case basis. France and the UK provided the political push behind ESDP at St Malo in December 1998 by underlining the need for the EU to be able to develop autonomous capabilities — albeit with slightly differing interpretations of how much autonomy was desirable. Following the pledges, key shortcomings were identified and a bottom–up plan was adopted to try and address these weaknesses. New structures were created to administer and oversee these emerging roles, including a Political and Security Committee, an EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff. The first ESDP operations commenced in 2003, both civilian and military, in Europe and outside.

Signalling a new, almost independent, tempo in policy making, one set of Headline Goals gave way to a second and the Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2000 gave way to annual capabilities improvement conferences. Stress was placed on filling the perceived military shortcomings and, in addition, special emphasis was been placed on the ability to respond rapidly to crises in the form of the Battle Groups concept. The Battle Groups

signal the EU's growing independence and rapidity of action. They also link the EU to the UN in that the Battle Groups are designed specifically, but not exclusively, for use in response to requests from the UN. The concept states that one battle group (1,500 troops) is on six–month standby at the beginning of 2006 and two of the thirteen battle groups will be on call at any given time by 2007, thus requiring all participating member countries to adopt similar standards and procedures.[3] Most notably, however, the Battle Groups constitute for the first time a permanent force that is available at very short notice, in contrast to the earlier concept of a pool from which the troops would be sought for each operation separately.

Civilian Crisis Management

The relatively speedy development of military crisis management capabilities of the EU, however, concealed a major weakness highlighted by the lessons of the Balkans: the need for civilian tools to complement military crisis management. The early emphasis on military aspects gave the larger member states, primarily France and the UK, a dominant role. Yet this did not always suit the mid–size EU members or states with a tradition of neutrality or non–alignment. Finland and Sweden were particularly active in emphasizing the need to put civilian crisis management on the same level as military crisis management, as well as emphasizing conflict prevention, the continuum–like nature of crisis response and, later, the importance of civil–military cooperation.

At the Feira European Council in June 2000, four civilian intervention areas were identified: the police, the rule of law, civilian administration and civilian protection. Specific capacities in these four areas may be used either in the context of independent missions managed by the EU or in the context of operations run by lead organizations, such as the UN or the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). In terms of police operations, the EU aims to make available police advice, assistance and training for in–field police substitution missions. In 2003, member states committed almost 5,000 personnel towards the police operation goal, with most personnel deployable in less than thirty days. For the rule of law, the EU is building capacity to shore up and, where appropriate, to re–establish credible local police forces and a properly functioning penitentiary and justice system. Some 631 officials (prosecutors, judges, penitentiary administration officers) have already been volunteered by member states.

The civilian administration goal includes the ability to have a pool of experts on standby to help bolster local administrative capacities in order to preserve bureaucratic functioning during crisis management. EU member states identified 562 experts capable of carrying out such tasks. Finally, the civil protection goal consists of having two or three 'advance teams' of ten experts always on call that can be sent within three to seven hours for crisis evaluation and early coordination. Those teams would be followed by intervention teams containing up to 2,000 people deployable for a short period, and more specialized groups deployable within two

weeks for more specific crisis needs. A civilian capabilities conference organized by member states in 2004 also identified an additional 391 advisors on such matters as human rights, political affairs and security sector reform who could also be deployed under EU auspices (European Union 2004). As of writing, there have been 14 military and civilian missions mobilized as part of ESDP (Table 1).

There is always an element of discretion in the very definition of something as a 'crisis' since there are an infinite number of potential crises to be managed at any given time. Thus, a choice is made as to what constitutes a suitable external crisis for the EU and what is suitable timing. Hence, what has characterized the EU's use of its external crisis management tools has been caution: at least at this juncture for ESDP, crises should be reasonably small, manageable and relatively 'safe' — failures would be fatal.

The choice of which crisis to respond to, given finite resources, is a complex mix of internal considerations that consider the location of the crisis, its magnitude, other means available to address the crisis and whether there has been a direct request for assistance. The operations listed in Table 1 demonstrate the wide variety of considerations. Intervention in the Western Balkans was in part altruistic and in part a pragmatic response to ongoing slaughter and thousands of refugees heading towards EU countries. The operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo commenced with a request from Kofi Annan for the EU to mount a two–month military presence in between the MONUC missions. The rule of law mission in Georgia was a direct response to a request from the Georgian government, while the operations in Iraq and Aceh stem from efforts to support broader stabilization efforts by the international community and regional actors, respectively. When military, police or civilian crisis teams are involved, it is of course the member states who ultimately have the say as to whether or not to release the requested personnel for the operation.[4]

In sum, the ESDP developed with specific external goals in mind, with much of the original focus placed on developing military capacities. Considering the political sensitivities involved with such matters, EU governments have taken careful steps — placing it in the second legal pillar of the EU, using unanimous voting rules to make decisions and closely overseeing progress — in order to control its development. The following section looks at the implications of the obstacles that this background has had on the development of a future, comprehensive approach to crisis management in the EU.

Sources of Divergence

As shown above, the ESDP has developed on a fairly independent track, one separated from existing external policies of the Community pillar as well as from the growing number of capacities geared towards internal security. This division is deeply rooted in institutional structures that separate 'Community' capacities (in the first pillar) from ESDP capacities (in the second pillar) and Justice and Home Affairs actions (in the third pillar). Within each pillar,

Table 1. Past and current EU operations

Name/location	Type	Dates	EU–25 personnel	Non–EU personnel
Past operations				
Concordia/fYROM	Military	March–December 2003	308	49
Artemis/DR Congo	Military	June–September 2003	1,800	0
Eujust Themis/Georgia	Rule of Law	June 2004–July 2005	10	0
Current operations				
EUPM/BiH (Sarajevo)	Police	January 2003–	435	54
EUPOL Proxima/fYROM	Police	December 2003–	145	17
EUFOR–Althea/BiH	Military	December 2004–	5,802	886
EUPOL KINSHASA/DR Congo	Police	April 2005–December 2005	30	0
EUSEC/DR Congo	Civilian	June 2005–June 2006	8	8
AMIS EU Supporting Action/Darfur	Civilian–Military	July 2005–December 2005+	9	—
EUJUST LEX/Iraq	Rule of Law	July 2005–July 2006	—	—
AMM/Aceh	Civilian	September 2005–March 2006	130	96
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories	Civilian	January 2006–January 2009+	33	—
EU BAM Rafah/Rafah crossing	Civilian	November 2005–November 2006	70	—
Border Assistance Mission/Moldova–Ukraine	Police/civilian	November 2005–November 2007	69	50

separate policy procedures and political actor formations guide decision making.[5]

These institutional divisions — and the profound tensions between Commission, Council and member states that they give rise to — militate against any convergence in the EU's security thinking and activities. To illustrate the point, this section shows the unclear competences and differing definitions that have surfaced as the EU has started ESDP crisis management activities abroad. The section concludes by considering the even greater challenges to drawing together external and internal capacities to manage crises.

Competing Competences

The most obvious distinction to be made to defuse the growing competition between the Community and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP - of which ESDP is an integral part) in crisis management and its numerous grey areas would be to divide crisis management responsibilities simply within the EU along internal and external lines, with the Community addressing internal crises and the CFSP mechanisms external exigencies. Not only does this ignore considerable Community competences in external relations that are of indirect and direct significance for crisis management, but it also ignores the fact that the Community has a direct role in managing crises outside the EU.

The ESDP developed in response to urgent exigencies and was pushed by several external reasons with little apparent attempt to think through crisis management responses and capabilities for the Union as a whole. The Community (including the many externally orientated policies contained in the first pillar and administered by the Commission) had been active in various crisis management related matters of external relations long before the development of ESDP (in the intergovernmental second pillar). The substantial competences of the Community in external relations, notably in development and assistance, trade and enlargement, gave it a highly significant role in using its collective tools for conflict prevention, to take but one example. These terms were not necessarily used at the time; such capacities were considered an outgrowth of the EU's general economic leverage. That leverage gave the EU the ability to be a strong external actor, using trade incentives to encourage political changes or development assistance to dampen conflicts, for instance. Such tools, and their deployment abroad, amount to what today would be called 'soft power'.

The development of conflict prevention and crisis management capacities within the Community as well as CFSP thus saw numerous areas of grey emerging where both pillars could legitimately claim competence. In addition to questions of legal competence, bureaucratic rivalry between the Commission and the Council also ensued. The differences between the two become more pronounced as the heavy bureaucracy of the Commission meets the new light structures established in the Council for crisis management purposes. In particular, the advent of the High Representative for CFSP and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit) in the Amsterdam Treaty marked a

significant development in the Council Secretariat's conflict prevention and crisis management potential. It also marked heavier involvement of national diplomats in CFSP and this was soon to be matched by the addition of seconded military personnel to the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the Police Unit and the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and, latterly, the Situation Centre (Sit–Cen). Most of the crisis management structures established in the Council Secretariat are based on experienced and senior national personnel whose years of experience, including that with other EU members, has given them a pragmatic outlook on the tasks at hand. By way of contrast, the Commission is more ponderous and bureaucratic, with six directorate–generals involved in the *famille Relex* and ten in ARGUS (see below). The Commission's strong point has always been, and will continue to be, access to the sizeable Community budget for external relations which is the weak point of the CFSP structures for most things other than administrative expenditure.

Competing Definitions

In the ESDP, crisis management refers to the Petersberg tasks which, for the most part, are self–explanatory (with the exception of the deliberately vague 'peacemaking').[6] The Commission's definition groups together a number of related concepts such as peace–building, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. According to the Commission, peace–building includes "actions undertaken over the medium and longer–term to address root–causes of violent conflicts in a targeted manner". "Root causes" incorporate diverse factors such as imbalance of political, socio–economic or cultural opportunities amongst different identity groups; lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance; lack of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests and the lack of a vibrant civil society. Conflict prevention, which has been a "fixed priority" for the Union since April 2001 following a Commission Communication, is seen as "actions undertaken in the short term to reduce manifest tension and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict" (see European Commission 2001). Conflict management is considered to be "actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts". Finally, conflict resolution is "action undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict".

The Commission definitions distinguish, though not always clearly, between short–, medium– and longer–term aspects of overall crisis management.[7] Although ESDP is primarily geared to short(er)–term crisis management, the Community's responsibilities cannot be considered as only longer term since, as has been seen, a number of shorter–term aspects are also mentioned.[8] In fact the actual tasks undertaken, their complexity and the duration of any crisis management appears to rely heavily upon a general consensus on the role of the EU in international affairs at a given point in time.

In fact, no clear distinction can be made between the roles of the Community (the Commission) and the member states (the Council) in crisis management either on the basis of a division of labour or the length of the operation. The absence of any such visible definitions on the Council side means that the terminology is open to interpretation and potential argument. The fact that the Maastricht Treaty extended CFSP to all areas of foreign and security policy, but with due observance for Community areas of competence, compounds the confusion. Nevertheless, the Commission definitions communicate very clearly that the Community sees itself as having a major role to play in all aspects of crisis management, with the possible exception of conflict resolution; although, even here, there are Community instruments that may prove influential.

Not surprisingly, these uncertainties and tensions give rise to fierce bureaucratic rivalries. The Commission is keen to preserve and promote its competences, while the Council and EU governments sometimes work to keep the Commission at arm's length from ESDP activities. In the case of jurisdiction over small arms and light weapons issues (SALW), tensions boiled over. The Commission took the Council before the Court of First Instance for a judgement on which institution had legal competence (*Official Journal of the EU* 2005).[9] This particular case is only one of a number of simmering tensions; others are evident over non–proliferation of WMD, human rights, arms control, conflict prevention, civil protection and defence industrial aspects.

The Internal Security Challenge

Considering the challenges that confront the EU's role abroad in crisis management, what are the prospects for bridging the external and internal dimensions of crisis management? It is worth noting that there are aspects of external crisis management that are very different from internal crisis management. Notably, the reasons for engaging in crisis management outside of the territory of the Union stem from different sources. For instance, the EU sees itself abroad as single actor, relating equally to other actors, organizations and states. Also, the EU is expected to act, both by European citizens and by outside actors. Part of the underpinning rationale also seems also to be collective self–interest; the European Security Strategy (see below) affirms that "A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight" (Solana 2003). Such a unified approach might be difficult to preserve in cases of internal crisis management, when a 'single voice' gives rise to twenty–five different ones. Furthermore, internally the EU does not act on behalf of its member countries as it does in external crisis management.

It would seem that the EU's action in crisis management outside its own territory enjoys a broad legitimacy and support, whereas its role in crises occurring within the territory shows that the role of the Union *vis–à–vis* the member states remain unclear. In the international context, the EU is not competing with its own member states, but rather posits itself as an actor

among other actors, such as NATO, the OSCE or the UN. In the case of external crises, a further difference is the degree of discretion: there is a choice as to whether to be involved or not, and the EU has also, when deciding to start an operation, the possibility of defining its length and goals clearly.

Sources of Convergence

As demonstrated above, the ESDP has its own policy goals, institutional pathways and political drivers. The friction that results from this independence, however, should not obscure the fact that there are several potential drivers of convergence in the years ahead, drivers that may eventually succeed in bringing together the external and internal dimensions of EU crisis management. In other words, some signs suggest that slowly, but surely, a number of barriers between the internal and external dimensions of crisis management are being eroded.

Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks

One driver is familiar to studies of general change in public policy: external, 'real–life' events. The earthquake and tsunamis at the end of 2004 put the issue of co–ordination both within the EU and with external partners into sharp relief, especially when it became apparent that disaster scenarios may often demand the mobilization and utilization of military and civilian resources. It gave clarity to the notion that the ESDP's military and civilian missions should be linked more effectively with humanitarian assistance, consular services and financial aid aspects on the Community side of the external equation.

New Ideas and Doctrines

The changing international context and the onset of real–life events, such as natural disasters and terror attacks, have also highlighted the need to develop strategic thinking and doctrines about EU security.

The ESDP development was initially event–driven and took the form of capacity development. The next stage — that of strategic thinking about what the Union would be doing with its new capacities — followed in 2003 when the EU adopted its first Security Strategy (ESS) (Solana 2003). The ESS is the first major attempt by the EU to provide a guiding framework behind its role on the world stage. It outlines a number of threats to the EU, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Particular regions are mentioned, such as the Middle East, as is the importance of conflict prevention and threat prevention, which "cannot start too early" and the importance of "effective multilateralism" and key partnerships are also touched upon.

The ESS is orientated mainly towards external security issues, suggesting that "the first line of defence will be abroad". Yet, in addition to implying an

eventual convergence of the external and the internal crisis management capacities, the ESS also makes some important conceptual links between internal and external security. It suggests that any one of the threats mentioned above, or a combination thereof, will confront the EU with complex challenges that are likely to demand a response that is neither solely military nor civilian or, for that matter, solely in the domain of the Community or CFSP. The threats may also possess a variety of internal and external manifestations which call for a broad range of response. Special reference in the ESS is made to intelligence cooperation, suggesting that cross–pillar cooperation and cross–agency cooperation, between national bodies and European bodies, such as Europol, must improve.

Another emerging doctrine stems from the EU's Action Plan on Terrorism, which provides additional arguments regarding the importance of harnessing the 'full range' of EU capacities to deal with crises. The Action Plan makes it clear that regular coordination, the exchange of information and personnel between the pillars (in this case primarily the Community, the 'third pillar' or Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and the member states) is essential in the formulation of a comprehensive approach to a threat.

The most concrete suggestions so far to merge aspects of internal and external crisis management appear in the report by Michel Barnier (2006), 'For a European civil protection force: europe aid'. Barnier's report, which considers the lack of any systematic scenarios or protocols at the European level for responding to a number of crises,[10] notes the need to pool more effectively national and regional resources for both internal and external crisis responses. The kind of equipment that is desirable for these contingencies includes transport planes to support humanitarian aid, alongside the need "for a systematic analysis of the complementary role of military resources" (Barnier 2006, 13). These forces, together with other equipment and personnel, should then be included in a Civil Protection Force, to be established under the aegis of Article 308 of the EC Treaty, along with an Operations Centre, to eventually take over from the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), and a Joint Training Institute.

A communication from the Commission to the June 2006 European Council noted "the inextricable link between the EU's internal and external policies" (European Commission 2006, 4). The communication notes the need to combine Community and intergovernmental methods on the basis of "what best achieves the desired outcome, rather than institutional theory or dogma" (*ibid.*, 6). A further report, by the outgoing Austrian Presidency, mirror's the Commission's thinking by noting the need for better coordination for a more effective response, getting assistance quickly where it is needed and protecting EU citizens abroad (Presidency 2006). Amongst the many suggestions made, the need for an Operational Manual on EU emergency and crisis coordination is actually one of the more helpful suggestions since it immediately focuses minds on issues of consistency as well as the nexus between internal and external security concerns.

Both Barnier's report, which is more specific, and the Commission's (more general in nature) clearly state the need to think through the implications of

the nexus between internal and external EU policies, strategic planning and resource implications, including the inevitable institutional implications within Brussels as well as the extent to which the member states may wish to link national capacities more closely with Brussels.

'Dual Use' and Overlapping Capacities

A number of policies implemented in one particular pillar of the EU are clearly applicable in other pillars. Over time, the institutional barriers which currently separate such policies and divide the internal and external dimensions of crisis management may erode.

One example is the sharing of intelligence and other crisis–relevant information. Such intelligence is needed not only in the field of counter–terrorism, but also in non–proliferation activities and missions abroad. It is shown below that through the Situation Centre, a unit within the Council structure, efforts are being made to integrate intelligence for multiple uses. Eventually, those practical efforts may succeed in overcoming some of the existing divisions between different types of crisis management activities.

Another example relates directly to the ESDP, where provision is being made for more effective ESDP tools to be used for disaster relief. In line with the mandate received from the Union's Heads of State and Government at the Hampton Court informal meeting in December 2005, Solana (2006) responded that "the principle of using assets developed in the ESDP context to support civil protection and humanitarian aid is an established one". One of the prime disaster response tools is strategic lift and this, as Solana noted, could be provided through the EU Military Staff and its strategic movement coordination unit (established as part of the Global Approach on Deployability), utilizing the Multinational Coordination Centres for strategic lift in Athens and Eindhoven. However, the availability of resources depends critically upon 'substantial' contributions from the member states.[11]

The use of ESDP medical assets, logistical support and nuclear, biological and chemical protection assets, have already been identified as 'critical' areas in which ESDP would play a role. The EU Military Staff is also identifying assets with specific disaster requirements (such as all–terrain ability, deployability, etc.). The modalities for deploying any such assets between the Brussels level and the capitals has not been finalized (it will, however, be on a case–by–case basis). The EU Satellite Centre also has an obvious support role through its provision of relevant geospatial information. Reaction capability is obviously paramount in disaster scenarios and this is being addressed by a number of measures, including a steering group under the authority of the Presidency, to ensure that decision–making bodies are better informed and prepared.

Overlapping capacities found in the various pillars may eventually lead to consolidation. The civilian crisis management areas of ESDP (civil protection, rule of law, civil administration and police missions) are, more often than not, the same civilian components that might be called upon for a border mission inside the EU. And those same components could be deployed

as part of the Community's civil protection teams. The original aim of the Community civil protection teams was to improve crisis management regarding natural and environmental disasters inside the EU. Since 11 September 2001, however, a 'Mechanism' for reinforced cooperation was added, making those teams available for disaster relief both inside and outside the EU.[12] The Community Civil Protection Mechanism allows for access to the military 'force catalogue' held by the EU Military Staff, which consists of a details database of personnel and resources that may be relevant for civil protection purposes (for example, air transport or the provision of heavy–duty water pumps may well have dual internal/external relevance) (European Commission 2005, 5). Within the Mechanism the MIC addresses calls for assistance and co–ordinates the practical response with the member states, candidates and European Economic Area countries. Again, MIC's mandate is not confined to contingencies within the EU and it has been called upon to assist in the response to external natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

It is increasingly apparent that many aspects of ESDP have practical implications for internal crisis management, most notably in air transport (either military or military–chartered). The strengthening of the Union's capacities for internal–external crisis response eventualities will, however, have institutional implications and these are now considered.

Institutional Venues and Informal Bridging

The creation of new institutional venues related to security and crisis management, venues that are accumulating responsibilities, may also fuel a more comprehensive crisis management approach in the years ahead.

Sit–Cen within the Council structure is expanding its competences at a rapid pace. The primary role of the Sit–Cen is to coordinate intelligence and to provide effective communication in regards to external EU missions. Seconded national officials (experts on short–term assignments) staff the Sit–Cen and disperse information to necessary EU and national partners under the 'EU Confidential' label of security clearance. The Sit–Cen provides a venue for the participation of actors across the institutions, although currently only DG *Relex* in the Commission plays a large role in supporting the Council's efforts here.

More recently, however, the Sit–Cen has been asked by member states to take a new role: to coordinate the procedures for an 'EU Crisis Group'. This group will contain all relevant Commission and Council leaders, and would be triggered in the event of a crisis internal to the territory of the EU. Currently the scenarios around which the Sit–Cen is organizing crisis plans include a terrorist attack or a human pandemic. This type of *ad hoc*, incremental accumulation of duties in the Sit–Cen is bridging (however informally) the institutional divisions that currently divide internal and external crisis management.

The creation of the Civilian–Military Cell (Civ–Mil Cell) in the EU Military Staff offers another illustration of convergence. The Civ–Mil Cell was

intended to create greater coherence between the military and civilian structures used to plan and to deploy EU crisis management missions. The aim of the Civ–Mil Cell is to reinforce the national headquarters of a member state leading an EU operation, and to build general capacity for running co-ordinated crisis management missions abroad. The Cell will have the capacity to "generate the operations centre and can also execute preparatory work, which includes generic planning, development of concepts, sample simplified planning documents, standard arrangements (in the legal, financial and contract fields) and, as a back–up to other parts of the Council Secretariat and the Military Staff, interoperability, scenarios and lessons learned" (European Commission 2005, Para. 22).

Additional benefits of the Civ–Mil Cell are emerging, however, in the form of more informal cooperation between ESDP and Community capacities. The Cell offers an entry point for relevant Commission departments to become involved more closely with mission planning. The Commission can play a useful role by ensuring consistency between ESDP and Community measures, by communicating how military assets might be used to supplement Community operations and by monitoring the preservation of the 'humanitarian space' concept.[13] Moreover, the creation of the Cell gives the EU a way to work with national governments on military and civilian co-ordination issues. For member states in which such co–ordination is lacking, the potential role for the Civ–Mil Cell in encouraging convergence should not be underestimated.

The Civ–Mil Cell also provides a potential partner for another institutional venue dealing with crisis management in the EU: the MIC. The MIC is staffed by the Commission and serves as the operational heart of the Civil Protection Mechanism described above. Since the Mechanism will be used in the future for both civilian and military deployments (initially abroad, but potentially at home), informal contacts are taking place between the Civ–Mil Cell and the MIC. MIC acts as the contact point for all of the national partners regarding civil protection, links together essential Commission services, such as the EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and DG *Relex*, and offers technical support and critical information during a crisis.

A number of *ad hoc* coordination bodies may provide a model for future bridging of external and internal capacities related to crisis management. One such example is the Crisis Response Coordination Team (CRCT) concept. There has been a CRCT for each ESDP operation thus far. The CRCT is not a standing structure but a "vehicle for inter–service coordination" with the intention of ensuring at the working level that the "Council and the Commission are in the position to ensure consistency that does not take decisions" (Council 2003, 31). It is also charged with responsibility for drawing up a Crisis Management Concept — a guiding framework for action. Of course, ventures like the CRCT idea cannot substitute for more regular links which will serve to make crisis response procedures automatic and not *ad hoc*. They represent 'short–term' solutions that do not always rest well with the longer–term perspective inherent in other Community activities.

Although further innovation will undoubtedly be required, multiple links already exist and these could be reinforced usefully. For example, the links between the EU Council Secretariat and the military duty desks, Foreign Ministries and Interior Ministries in the national capitals could be further strengthened for internal or external contingencies. Effective crisis response will also imply strengthening existing inter–institutional links between the MIC, ECHO, the EU Military Staff, the Sit–Cen, the Satellite Centre as well as national links.

Information Networks

A growing response to institutional division and capacity divergence in the EU is to 'fix' the problem with better information networks. Within the Commission, for instance, there are about ten crisis centres independently developed to address various crises. A number of efforts are underway to strengthen coordination within the Commission, including the creation on 20 October 2004 of ARGUS and a Central Crisis Centre (European Commission 2004, 10). ARGUS is being developed and will eventually be a central network in the Commission for the rapid flow of information between the EU rapid alert systems. The Central Crisis Centre is also in the process of being established with the aim of coordinating efforts so that a comprehensive evaluation may be made in order to determine options and appropriate responses. It is not immediately apparent who the Council counterparts are but it seems logical to suggest that the Sit–Cen, with its access to shared intelligence, as well as the Policy Unit (consisting of around twenty seconded diplomats who draw up independent analyses, propose strategic options and assist the High Representative), might be involved in sharing information in the early stages of a crisis or disaster and in outlining possible options.

A further critical information network is the Commission's 129 delegations who, with their global span, are in the position of advising on potential challenges or threats to regional or international stability. They now, mainly at the insistence of the Council Secretariat, report regularly on proliferation of WMD issues, on human rights as well as environmental factors. All of these have implications not only for external foreign and security policy considerations, but may also have profound implications for internal security and stability. The existence of external crises may also directly affect the well–being of EU citizens be trapped in a crisis zone and who may wish to avail themselves of consular or other assistance.

The Search for Legitimacy

Proposals to boost the EU's role in either the internal or external components of security (and in any policy activity for matter) must be perceived as 'legitimate' — in other words, politically acceptable, practically necessary and publicly supported. This dynamic may work toward the favour of future convergence of external and internal security. From an ESDP perspective, there is a logic to placing greater emphasis on the internal–external dimensions

of security since European citizens have expressed their concerns about the general threats posed by organized crime, terrorism and illegal migration issues. It could be argued that the case for not only more efficient but increased expenditure on the external dimensions of security would be easier to pitch if there are demonstrable benefits for internal security. However, thus far it has not been problematic at all to justify expenditure on external action. As a matter of fact, citizens seem to appreciate the EU's growing international role. It might be rather the EU's role in internal security that needs new sources of legitimacy. One such source might be the external role. People might become aware of the fact that the kind of expertise and training required for personnel in, for example, a monitoring mission in Aceh, is also of direct, as well as indirect, benefit to EU citizens. Member states might also be more willing to boost capacities for internal security if those same capacities can be deployed abroad.

Conclusions

The creation of the ESDP has occurred against a shifting backdrop of security concerns in the EU. New policies and high–level declarations frequently cite the need to turn all of the EU's crisis management resources toward new threats. Whether addressing natural disasters, terrorist attacks or trouble spots abroad, EU leaders use a rhetoric that implies future convergence of the various resources and capacities spread across the EU's institutions. The EU Action Plan on Terrorism, the recent call for an EU Civil Protection Force and even the ESDP itself, which supposedly "covers all aspects of security", increasingly sing from the same hymn sheet.

This article took the unusual step of including ESDP in a discussion about security broadly defined. It was shown that, as the result of its unique development, the ESDP sits awkwardly in that discussion. Deep institutional divisions, competing definitions of 'crisis management' and fierce bureaucratic politics risk that the ESDP will remain at arm's length from internal security concerns in the short term. Yet, several factors have also been pointed out that may drive convergence in the longer term. One important finding is that much of the ambiguity and ill–defined goals of the ESDP produce competition today, but can also illuminate points of convergence and cooperation for the future.

This analysis confirms that short–term solutions, such as defusing competition between the Community and ESDP by allotting internal crisis management to the former and external exigencies to the latter, are overly simplistic. They ignore the considerable Community competences in external relations that are of both direct, and indirect, significance for crisis management. Moreover, such a divide ignores ESDP's potentially important role in a variety of military and civilian roles in civilian crises, such as bringing military and civilian expertise and resources to bear on urgent and unforeseen crises that hit the European continent.

One major, arguably the greatest, barrier to comprehensive crisis management in the EU boils down to politics and the different approaches

EU governments take to cooperation at home versus abroad. EU actions outside its own territory enjoy broad legitimacy and support. In the international context, the EU is not competing against its own member states, but posits itself as an actor among other actors such as NATO. Member states have control over ESDP, not only over the decision process but also the type, location and duration of missions.

Such luxuries do not present themselves when it comes to internal crises. Member states must act, and act effectively, without warning and opportunities to prepare properly. The politics are different, the role of the EU is less clear and political uncertainties undermine the legitimacy with which the EU might take part. One should always recall, however, that legitimacy is secured not just through political agreement, but also through the effectiveness of policy outputs. In this respect, the current official thinking on extending the linkages between internal and external crisis responses is welcome. Indeed, the suggestions on the table go well beyond ESDP to include other areas of CFSP: the area of freedom, security and justice; numerous (case–dependent) areas of Community policy; the Commission's External Service and the member states themselves. The proposals, when considered together, promise fundamental changes in EU external relations generally and, in particular, crisis management. But, eventually, it has to come down to the hard–nosed questions of who does what (competences) and with what (resources).

Notes

1. There are terminological difficulties related to the concepts of 'security' and 'crisis management'. The ESDP's role abroad is described consistently as relating to security, with crisis management missions contributing towards that goal. The same can be said for internal matters: security is a broad concept, while crisis management capacities contribute towards the goal of a 'secure' Europe. The concept of an EU 'protection space' that encompasses both internal and external security aspects is a useful concept (see Introduction to this issue) that obviates some of the above difficulties, but still leaves us with the practical issues of who does what.
2. Indeed, they were further broadened in the proposed Constitutional Treaty to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance to third countries, conflict prevention and post–conflict stabilization.
3. Almost all member countries participate, even though the original idea in the draft constitutional treaty was that this would be an activity for a core group of most willing and most capable countries only.
4. The acrimonious debates in the Dutch parliament in February 2006 over whether to send Dutch soldiers to the south of Afghanistan to support NATO operations also illustrates that endless requests for NATO (or EU) assistance, especially for more dangerous operations, will elicit careful scrutiny.
5. As is well known, the proposed Constitutional Treaty for Europe would have nominally abolished the pillar structure and, according to proponents, brought a new coherence and coordination to EU policies.
6. The tasks were adopted initially in 1992 by the Western European Union. This was the same year that Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General, unveiled his *Agenda for Peace* which included the term "peace enforcement". The term was felt by some WEU members to be too 'muscular' and the term 'peacemaking' was preferred since it not only sounded more neutral and traditional in peacekeeping terms, but also left the question of how muscular the EU member states might be prepared to be as an open issue.
7. Definitions at http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/definition.htm.
8. Although even here highly subjective assessments of what constitutes crisis management may apply since, arguably, much of the Community's external activities has a stabilization effect.

9. Action brought on 21 February by the European Commission against the Council of the European Union, Case C–91/05, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C115/10, 14 May 2005. At the time of writing the outcome of the SALW case is unknown, but it will be a landmark decision since it may help establish much–needed benchmarks for other grey areas. The ruling will be all the more important since any adoption of the constitutional treaty by the member states, which would have obviated some (but not all) of these tensions, is likely to be beyond the life of the Barroso Commission.
10. These are: earthquakes and tsunamis; forest fires and other fires; floods and landslides; industrial and nuclear accidents; terrorist attacks; disasters at sea; and pandemics.
11. An intermediary step is the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) which, from 20 October 2005, makes assets available to the participating states on the basis of allocated flight hours over a 72–hour period (2,000 in total). France has already announced that its flight hours under the contract would be allocated to priority EU usage.
12. The mechanism can also be used to support ESDP crisis management operations. It has been activated in Central Europe (2002), France (2003), the *Prestige* accident (2002), Algeria (2003), Iran (2003), Morocco (2004), Portugal (2004) and Asunción (2004). Curiously the ESDP civil protection mechanism, which can draw on the Community mechanism, is nevertheless separate (see Ekengren & Rhinard (this issue) for more on the Community's civil protection capacities).
13. Strict and clear guidelines are laid down in international law guiding the use of military and civil defence assets in humanitarian operations. Thus, although there may be scope for further discussion about how military assets may contribute to specific humanitarian operations, the parameters within which they operate must be respected. The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (often called the Oslo Guidelines) and the UN Guidelines on the Use of MCDA in Complex Emergencies (2003) are the primary applicable rules.

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